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WELCOME TO THE JUNGLE: THE APPLICATION OF
FOREIGN LAW IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT LITIGATION
BRYAN S. DAVID*
I. INTRODUCTION
ORDINARILY, ALL LEGALLY significant aspects pertainingto a lawsuit emanate from a single state (usually the state
where the lawsuit was filed), and the court assigned to the law-
suit decides the case based strictly upon the laws of that state.1
However, by its very nature, aircraft accident litigation often
arises from factual scenarios involving people and aircraft ema-
nating from multiple states and even multiple nations. And
those scenarios often raise questions regarding which law will
apply. The body of law known alternatively as “conflict of laws”
or “choice of laws” was specially designed to answer those
questions.
However, over the decades, the process has evolved into some-
thing significantly complex and variable. This inspired one
judge to famously describe choice of law as:
a veritable jungle, which, if the law can be found out, leads not to
a “rule of action” but a reign of chaos dominated in each case by
* Bryan S. David is a partner at the law firm of Cantey Hanger, LLP in Dallas,
Texas. His practice focuses on aviation tort and commercial litigation involving
civilian and military aircraft accidents, aircraft maintenance, aircraft transactions,
indemnity, products liability, mass torts, and multi-district litigation. He
represents major aviation manufacturers, aircraft owners and operators, repair
stations, flight schools, and pilots in litigation arising in the United States and
across the globe. Mr. David is certified as a commercial pilot for single and multi-
engine aircraft. He has an instrument rating, and he is a certified flight
instructor. Mr. David has also been trained in aerobatics and emergency
maneuvers. He is a past president of the Flying Aggies flight club and past
member of the Oklahoma State University collegiate flight team.
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
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the judge’s “informed guess” as to what some other state other
than the one in which he sits would hold its law to be.2
By the end of this article, the reader should be equipped with
the machete necessary to carve a path through the jungle. This
article will provide an overview of choice of law; it will discuss
the various choice of law standards employed in state and fed-
eral courts across the nation; it will discuss the factors evaluated
in the popular Restatement test; and it will discuss the practical
considerations that often influence decisions regarding choice
of law.
II. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHOICE OF LAW
At the beginning of any case involving contacts with multiple
jurisdictions, it is important to identify the states involved and
the potential issues in the case.3 Many times a pleading is filed
alleging claims and damages entirely based on the forum’s sub-
stantive law. And, unless there is a jurisdictional challenge or a
venue problem, the parties race towards trial without stopping
to ask what law will (or should) be used in the jury charge.
When the pleadings or discovery reveal that multiple states
have contact with the underlying facts, certain questions should
be asked to determine if choice of law may have a role in the
resolution of the case. For example, where are the various par-
ties from? What is the true relationship between the parties?
Where did the alleged events giving rise to the accident occur,
and what is the connection between those events and the loca-
tion of the accident? What damages are sought by the plaintiffs?
What causes of action are alleged in the pleadings? All of this is
important to determine if a choice of law analysis is worthwhile.
Additionally, it is important to evaluate the potential differ-
ences in the substantive law of the various states with a connec-
tion to the case and any conflicts in that law that may affect the
outcome. If there is no actual conflict between the various state
laws that could apply to the relevant issues, the court will likely
apply the law of the forum and forgo a deeper choice of law
analysis:
2 In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp. 793,
795 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (quoting In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp.
732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975)).
3 See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp.,
263 Fed. App’x 604, 606 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the first step is to “examine
the substantive law of each jurisdiction to determine whether the laws differ as
applied to the relevant transaction”).
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At the outset of any case in which legally significant facts have
occurred in more than one state, the Court must identify those
states that have sufficient contacts with this litigation. Once these
states have been identified, this Court must determine whether
the various substantive laws at issue differ with regard to the par-
ticular issues in contest. Should the substance of the relevant
state laws differ or conflict, then it will become necessary to apply
the choice of law rules . . . .4
Furthermore, it is important to weigh the true connection be-
tween the various states and the issues in the case because,
under most choice of law rules, a state with little substantive in-
terest in the issues will be given little, if any, consideration. For
example, a state with “fortuitous” contacts with the parties, such
as the location of the accident in a transnational flight, may be
disregarded in the choice of law analysis.5 But if the state has a
more substantive connection, such as the domicile of the par-
ties, that state’s interests may be given greater weight, depend-
ing on the issue involved.6 This is important because, under the
doctrine of depecage, different states’ laws may be applied to the
different issues in the case.
III. DEPECAGE (IT’S NOT FOR DECORATING
ANTIQUES)
A key concept behind modern choice of law rules is the con-
cept of depecage. Depecage “is the process of analyzing different
issues within the same case separately under the laws of different
states.”7 In other words, depecage allows different issues within a
cause of action to be defined by the laws of multiple jurisdic-
tions.8 For example, in a negligence case, duty/standard of care,
4 In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 750 F. Supp. at 796; see Rodgers v. Beech-
craft Corp., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1167–68 (N.D. Okla. 2017) (stating that it was
not necessary to resolve the choice-of-law issue because “[t]he Court has com-
pared the manufacturer’s products liability and negligence law of Oklahoma and
Kansas, and there is no substantial difference” regarding the issues raised).
5 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, Denver, Colo. on
Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1452 (D. Colo. 1988) (stating that in air crash
cases courts often view the place of the crash (“the situs of injury”) as fortuitous).
6 Id. at 1451 (noting the domicile of the plaintiffs is given more weight when
the issue is compensatory damages but very little weight when the issue is punitive
damages).
7 Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind. 2004).
8 See Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[D]ifferent
substantive issues in a single case may have to be resolved under the laws of differ-
ent states where the choices influencing decisions differ.”).
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compensatory damages, and punitive damages could be defined
by the laws of different jurisdictions.9
Depecage is the engine that drives the choice of law analysis in
many jurisdictions, and it is explicitly integrated into the popu-
lar most significant relationship test established under the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (Restatement). Section
145 states that the various contacts enumerated within the rule
“are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.”10 According to one court:
Thus, it is important to understand that the search for the appli-
cable law is not a general one, but rather it is one that takes
proper notice of the fact that the significance of a state’s relation-
ship to a particular aviation disaster may vary as a function of the
particular issue presented.11
It is important to note, however, that depecage is not universally
accepted. States employing the lex loci framework for choice of
law reject the concept.12 Furthermore, some have criticized the
concept of depecage because it allegedly creates a “Frankenstein’s
monster” that could thwart the purposes of the legislature in
enacting bodies of law and give parties with access to resources
an unfair advantage.13 As one commentator protested: “a party
‘should not be allowed to put “together half a donkey and half a
camel, and then ride to victory on the synthetic hybrid.”’”14 De-
spite the criticisms of those who reject the wonders of animal
husbandry, depecage is the mule that carries the load in modern
choice of law, especially in the complex situations presented in
aircraft accident litigation.15
9 See In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, N.Y. on Nov. 12, 2001, 2006 WL 1288298,
at *23–24 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006) (“[T]he issue of punitive damages is distinct
from the issue of compensatory damages and, therefore, the application of differ-
ent laws to these different issues may be appropriate . . . . [I]t is well settled that
the law applicable to issues of compensatory damages may be different than the
law applicable to standard of conduct.”).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (AM. LAW INST. 1971);
see also In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 926 F. Supp.
736, 740 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
11 In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., 926 F. Supp. at 740.
12 Simon, 805 N.E. 2d at 802–03.
13 Id. (“By making separate determinations for each issue within a claim, the
process amalgamates the laws of different states, producing a hybrid that may not
exist in any state . . . [B]y applying depecage a court may hinder the policy of one
or more states without furthering the considered policy of any state.”).
14 Id. at 803.
15 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, Denver, Colo. on Nov.
15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 n.3 (D. Colo. 1988) (“Although depecage may
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IV. PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW
After the various states with potential interests are identified,
the next step in the choice of law analysis is to establish that an
actual conflict exists between the law of the forum and the law
of the foreign state (or states).16 Generally, the party seeking the
application of foreign law has the burden of proof on this is-
sue.17 If no conflict is demonstrated, courts will generally as-
sume that the law of the interested foreign state is the same as
the law of the forum, and the court will proceed with the appli-
cation of the forum’s laws.18 Thus, demonstration of an actual
conflict is key to success. But this necessarily raises a practical
and legal question—how does one prove the substance of a for-
eign jurisdiction’s laws? Like all good legal questions, the answer
depends on the circumstances.
A. ESTABLISHING THE LAWS OF “SISTER STATES” WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES
When the foreign state at issue is another state within the
United States (a sister state), proof of foreign law may be simpli-
fied. In this case, a timely motion for judicial notice of the sister
state’s laws (or a similar device) is often the most expeditious
and prudent means of establishing the substance of that law in
lead to the application of the law of different jurisdictions to different issues
within the same case, the approach is widely applied to the multifaceted issues
involved in aviation litigation.”).
16 See, e.g., Lewis v. Lycoming, 917 F. Supp. 2d 366, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2013) ( “The
initial step in our analysis requires us to focus on whether there is a ‘true conflict
between the relevant laws.’”); In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16,
1987, 750 F. Supp. 793, 796 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (stating that once the interested
states are identified, the “[c]ourt must determine whether [its] various substan-
tive laws . . . differ with regard to the particular issues in contest”).
17 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136 cmt. f (AM. LAW
INST. 1971) (“Frequently, the local law of the forum will provide that the party
who claims that the foreign law is different from the local law of the forum has
the burden of establishing the content of the foreign law.”).
18 Colvin v. Colvin, 291 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.) (“If a
party . . . fails to provide adequate proof of the content of [the foreign state’s]
law, the law of that jurisdiction will be presumed to be the same as Texas law.”);
see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136 cmt. h (AM. LAW
INST. 1971) (“[W]here either no information, or else insufficient information,
has been obtained about the foreign law, the forum will usually decide the case in
accordance with its own local law except when to do so would not meet the needs
of the case or would not be in the interests of justice.”).
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either state or federal court.19 In fact, judicial notice has long
been available as a tool to accomplish this goal.
As far back as 1885, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
“[t]he law of any State of the Union, whether depending upon
statutes or upon judicial opinions, is a matter of which the
courts of the United States are bound to take judicial notice,
without plea or proof.”20 And, since 1936, when the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted
the Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, most states have adopted
statutes and rules requiring a state court to take judicial notice
of the statues, rules, ordinances, or court decisions of their sister
states.21 An example of such a rule is Texas Rule of Evidence
202, which is fairly simple, and which establishes fairly liberal
timing and notice requirements for taking judicial notice of a
sister state’s law:
(a) Scope.—This rule governs judicial notice of another state’s,






- court decisions; and
- common law.
(b) Taking Notice.—The court:
(1) may take judicial notice on its own; or
(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the
court is supplied with the necessary information.
(c) Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard.
(1) Notice.—The court may require a party requesting judi-
cial notice to notify all other parties of the request so
they may respond to it.
(2) Opportunity to Be Heard.—On timely request, a party is
entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial
notice and the nature of the matter to be noticed. If the
court takes judicial notice before a party has been noti-
fied, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.
(d) Timing.—The court may take judicial notice at any stage of
the proceeding.
19 See, e.g., Colvin, 291 S.W.3d at 514 (“To assure the application of the laws of
another jurisdiction, a preliminary motion is required.”).
20 Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885).
21 C.T. Dreschler, Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1437, at
*2 (1952).
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(e) Determination and Review.—The court–not the jury–must de-
termine the law of another state, territory, or federal jurisdic-
tion. The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling
on a question of law.22
It is important to note that, although judicial notice is available
to establish the law of a sister state, it is generally not available
when the foreign state at issue is a foreign country.23 Addition-
ally, although judicial notice may serve to streamline the process
of establishing the law of a sister state, complex issues may re-
quire more proof, including expert affidavits in order to fully
establish the letter of the law and its proper application under
the sister state’s legal framework, and to establish an actual con-
flict of law.
B. ESTABLISHING THE LAW OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
The establishment of the law of a foreign country is often
more complex than the establishment of the law of a sister state.
Language and cultural differences may create significant com-
plications to the understanding and application of the foreign
country’s law.24 That being said, the bar is not high.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 (Federal Rule 44.1) con-
trols the determination of foreign law in federal courts:
A party who intends to raise an issue about a foreign country’s
law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determin-
ing foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or
source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party
or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s
determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.25
There are a couple of interesting aspects of this rule that merit
consideration. First, the rule does not require a notice of inten-
tion to apply foreign law in a pleading or any other specific doc-
ument. The rule merely requires notice to be provided “by a
pleading or other writing.”26 Second, the rule does not create a
22 TEX. R. EVID. 202.
23 See Bangaly v. Baggiani, 20 N.E.3d 42, 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (“[U]nder the
Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, Illinois courts cannot take judicial
notice of the laws of foreign countries . . . . Thus, in Illinois, the laws of foreign
countries must be pled and proven as any other fact.”).
24 See Boromei v. United States, 2003 WL 25796654, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (re-
fusing to apply Saudi Arabia law, in part, due to the significant language and
cultural differences between Saudi Arabia and Florida).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1.
26 Id. (emphasis added).
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specific deadline for the notice. The Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 44.1 state that the rule “does not attempt to set any defi-
nite limit on the party’s time for giving the notice of an issue of
foreign law; in some cases the issue may not become apparent
until the trial, and notice then given may still be reasonable.”27
Further, the committee stated that “[i]f notice is given by one
party it need not be repeated by any other and serves as a basis
for presentation of material on the foreign law by all parties.”28
The court is not limited to the consideration of any particular
form of evidence in determining foreign law: “the court may
consider any relevant material or source . . . .”29 Furthermore,
the court may even conduct its own research into the matter:
[The court] may engage in its own research and consider any
relevant material thus found. The court may have at its disposal
better foreign law materials than counsel have presented, or may
wish to reexamine and amplify material that has been presented
by counsel in partisan fashion or in insufficient detail.30
Although the court may conduct its own research, there is no
requirement to do so, and one should not rely upon the court to
conduct the necessary research.31
The rules applied in many state courts closely follow (and, in
some cases, are identical to) Federal Rule 44.1.32 However, there
are some differences. Since we examined the Texas rule on judi-
cial notice of law of sister states, we will examine the associated
rule regarding the determination of the law of a foreign coun-
try, which varies from Federal Rule 44.1:
(a) Raising a Foreign Law Issue.—A party who intends to raise an
issue about a foreign country’s law must:
(1) give reasonable notice by a pleading or other writing;
and
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendments; Mut.
Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., 358 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding notice
of intention to rely on Cayman Island law was sufficient when given during pre-
trial conference).
28 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendments.
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 (emphasis added).
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendments.
31 Mut. Serv. Ins. Co., 358 F.3d at 1321 (stating that the “court is not required to
conduct its own research” and indicating that notice, without directing the court
to a specific case or statute, was insufficient).
32 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-43(c) (1968); HAW. R. CIV. P. 44.1; W. VA. R.
CIV. P. 44.1.
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(2) at least 30 days before trial, supply all parties a copy of
any written materials or sources the party intends to use
to prove the foreign law.
(b) Translations.—If the materials or sources were originally writ-
ten in a language other than English, the party intending to
rely on them must, at least 30 days before trial, supply all
parties both a copy of the foreign language text and an En-
glish translation.
(c) Materials the Court May Consider; Notice.—In determining for-
eign law, the court may consider any material or source,
whether or not admissible. If the court considers any mate-
rial or source not submitted by a party, it must give all parties
notice and a reasonable opportunity to comment and submit
additional materials.
(d) Determination and Review.—The court—not the jury—must
determine foreign law. The court’s determination must be
treated as a ruling on a question of law.33
Although Texas Rule of Evidence 203 (Rule 203) does impose
certain deadlines for notice and submission of materials (i.e.,
thirty days before trial), the requirements are not demanding.34
Furthermore, like Federal Rule 44.1, Rule 203 allows the court
to consider “any material or source” in determining foreign
law.35 In one case, a Texas court utilized this provision to justify
the reliance on excerpts from a “Martindale-Hubbell International
Law Digest” and a text entitled “Doing Business in Japan” pertain-
ing to Japanese law to determine the recovery of attorney’s
fees.36 So, when the rule says “any,” it apparently means any.
V. WHICH STATE’S CHOICE OF LAW RULES ARE
APPLIED?
Once it is determined that multiple states have an interest or
connection with the issues in the case, and it is determined that
a conflict exists between the laws of those states, a natural ques-
tion arises: which state’s choice of law rules will be applied? State
33 TEX. R. EVID. 203(a)–(d).
34 Id. at 203.
35 Id. at 203(c).
36 PennWell Corp. v. Ken Assocs., 123 S.W.3d 756, 761–62 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (stating that the parties failed to present ex-
pert testimony or affidavits regarding the laws of Japan but finding the excerpts
from a “Martindale-Hubbell International Law Digest” and a text entitled “Doing Busi-
ness in Japan” sufficient to determine the recovery of attorney’s fees under Japa-
nese law).
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courts generally apply their own choice of law rules (i.e., the
rules of the forum) when deciding choice of law issues.37
Although the selection of choice of law rules is fairly straight-
forward in state courts, it can be much more complex in federal
court. There are many sources that dictate which choice of law
rules will be applied in federal court. For example, “[a] federal
court sitting in diversity must utilize the forum state’s choice-of-
law rules.”38 And, “[a] federal court exercising supplemental ju-
risdiction is bound to apply the law of the forum state, including
its choice of law rules.”39 However, when a federal court is pre-
siding over a number of diversity actions consolidated as a mul-
tidistrict litigation, the court must apply the choice of law rules
from each of the jurisdictions where the cases were originally
filed, not the rules applied in the forum state of the multidis-
trict-litigation court.40
When a federal court’s jurisdiction is based on a federal ques-
tion, the court will generally apply the choice of law rules
adopted under federal common law.41 This typically requires the
application of the most significant relationship test established
under the Restatement.42 However, these are not the only
sources of choice of law rules applied routinely in federal court.
The various paths to a choice of law decision may make many
turns depending on the claims, parties, statutes, and circuit in-
volved.43 Thus, special attention to this issue should be paid in
the more “exotic” cases.
37 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1971)
(“A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of
its own state on choice of law.”).
38 Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
39 Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 761 (6th Cir. 1998).
40 In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, Ger. v. Lockheed Corp., 81 F.3d 570,
576 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Where a transferee court presides over several diversity
actions consolidated under the multidistrict rules, the choice of law rules of each
jurisdiction in which the transferred actions were originally filed must be ap-
plied.”); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, Denver, Colo. on Nov.
15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1448 (D. Colo. 1988).
41 Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. TCI Pac. Commc’ns, Inc., 2012 WL 4006122, at
*10 (N.D. Okla. 2012) (stating that when “federal question jurisdiction is in-
voked, federal courts generally apply federal common law principles to resolve
choice of law disputes,” and that “in the absence of guidance from Congress,
courts have relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of the Law”).
42 Id.
43 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (establishing the choice-of-law
principles applicable in maritime tort cases); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
573 F.3d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that the choice-of-law rules of the
forum apply when considering issues governed by state law in Foreign Sovereign
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VI. A VARIETY OF CHOICE OF LAW TESTS AND THEIR
APPLICATION
In order to make the final determination on which state’s law
will apply, the court must execute the applicable choice of law
test. However, there are many such tests employed in the various
jurisdictions of the United States. Some states have established
their own individual choice of law tests, while many apply the
most significant relationship test established in the Restate-
ment.44 An evaluation of all of the various tests is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, a consideration of certain tradi-
tional tests provides insight into the challenges associated with
choice of law and the impact of the doctrine. Also, we will con-
sider unique factors that should be considered when applying
the tests.
A. THE LEX LOCI DELICTI TEST
Under lex loci delicti, the choice of law is determined by “[t]he
law of the place where the tort or other wrong was committed”
(typically the location of the accident or injury).45 Although it
was once the national standard, lex loci delicti is no longer a pop-
ular test, as it is largely criticized as an antiquated view on choice
of law.46 However, despite this criticism, a small minority of
states continue to apply it in tort cases.47 This doctrine and its
alleged faults are well illustrated in the case entitled Pease v.
Main Turbo Systems.48
Immunities Act cases); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 564 (9th
Cir. 1992) (stating that federal common law choice-of-law rules apply in an action
removed to federal court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Boromei
v. United States, 2003 WL 25796654, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (stating that the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act mandates application of the forum state’s choice-of-law
rules).
44 See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp., 263
Fed. App’x 604, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying California’s “governmental in-
terest analysis” for choice of law); Rodgers v. Beechcraft Corp., 248 F. Supp. 3d
1158, 1167 (N.D. Okla. 2017) (applying the most significant relationship test
adopted by Oklahoma); In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Lit., 2016 WL 6072406,
at *145–54 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (reciting the tests from multiple jurisdictions includ-
ing New York’s “interest analysis” test); Pease v. Main Turbo Sys., 768 F. Supp. 2d
775, 778 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (applying Alabama’s lex loci delicti test).
45 Lex loci, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
46 E.g., Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 635-37 (Okla. 1974) (reciting the
criticisms and abandonment of the lex loci delicti).
47 Id. at 635.
48 Pease, 768 F. Supp. 2d 775.
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Pease arose out of the crash of a Piper Saratoga that occurred
near Tazewall, Tennessee in 2005.49 The pilot suffered serious
injuries in the crash.50 The pilot filed suit against fifteen defend-
ants, including Lycoming Engines, alleging that the crash was
caused by oil starvation.51 The lawsuit was originally filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama; however,
it was ultimately transferred to the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania.52 Lycoming filed a motion for
the determination of applicable law asserting that, under Ala-
bama’s lex loci delicti test, the court was required to apply Tennes-
see substantive law to the pilot’s claims.53 The pilot contended
that lex loci delicti should not be applied and that Pennsylvania
law should govern his claims.54
The court noted that, despite the transfer of the case to Penn-
sylvania, the court was bound to apply Alabama’s choice of law
rules because the case was originally filed there.55 The court rec-
ognized that the lex loci delicti test required the court to apply the
substantive law of the state where the injury occurred, which, in
this case, was Tennessee.56 The court noted that Alabama had a
long history—more than a century—of adherence to the lex loci
delicti doctrine.57 Thus, the court was bound to apply it.58 How-
ever, that did not stop the court from complaining about it.
The court stated that lex loci delicti is “quite simply, an anti-
quated and illogical approach to conflicts of laws in 21st century
tort actions,” and the court noted that the doctrine was only fol-
lowed by a handful of jurisdictions, predominantly in the
south.59 The court went on to explain why the case was a prime
example of what the court dubbed the “nonsensical effect” of lex
loci delicti, especially for aviation accident cases:






55 Id. at 777 (“[A] transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) does not change the
applicable state law; hence, a transferee court is required to apply the choice of
law of the transferor court’s state . . . . Thus, Alabama’s choice of law jurispru-
dence governs the instant matter.”).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 778
59 Id. (noting that, as of 2010, only ten states followed lex loci delicti including
Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
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Aviation accident claims, like the instant matter, uniquely illus-
trate the nonsensical effect of a rigid application of the doctrine
of lex loci delicti . . . . [T]he parties have no connection to Tennes-
see other than the aleatoric location of the crash site. Plaintiffs
reside in Ohio, the destination of the flight in question. Plaintiffs
raise product liability claims against a Pennsylvania corporation
which purportedly designed and manufactured the product in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The flight originated from
Asheville, North Carolina. Tennessee was neither the origin of
the flight in question nor the destination. The situs of the acci-
dent, and consequently the choice of law, were simply
happenstance.60
Despite the court’s “disdain for sweeping application of lex loci
delicti,” and despite the court’s desire for the Alabama Supreme
Court to change its ways, the court applied the doctrine and
granted the motion to apply Tennessee law.61
This case illustrates the tensions that have led the majority of
states to reject lex loci delicti. That being said, it is interesting to
note that § 175 of the Restatement establishes a clear preference
for applying the law of “the state where the injury occurred” (lex
loci delicti) unless another state has a more significant relation-
ship to the particular issue.62 We will address the Restatement
test later in this article.
B. THE LEX FORI TEST
Lex fori means “law of the forum.”63 Like lex loci delicti, the doc-
trine of lex fori is generally considered an antiquated method of
addressing choice of law.64 As of this writing, only two jurisdic-
tions—Kentucky and Michigan—continue to apply some form
of lex fori.65 Upon consideration, lex fori is not much of a choice
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
63 Lex fori, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
64 See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 2008 WL 2151995
(E.D. Ky. 2008); Pippa Rogerson, Choice of Law in Tort: A Missed Opportunity?, 1995
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 650, 656 (1995).
65 See Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd. 562 N.W.2d 466, 469-71
(Mich. 1997). It should be noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court recently
stated that it applied the Restatement test in both contract and tort actions.
Kirilenko v. Kirilenko, 505 S.W.3d 766, 769 (Ky. 2016) (“Kentucky follows the
‘most significant relationship’ approach in tort and contract cases.”). However,
an examination of the citations in that opinion indicates that Kentucky may not
apply the entirety of the most significant relationship test: “[O]nly certain sec-
tions of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws have actually been adopted in
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of law doctrine—it really makes no choice at all. It is basically an
anti-choice of law doctrine, and as such, it is generally incompat-
ible with current choice of law concepts like depecage. The opera-
tion of lex fori is exemplified by the case titled In re Air Crash at
Lexington, Kentucky.66
In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky arose out the crash of
Comair Flight 5191, which ran off the end of the runway during
takeoff at Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky.67 Cana-
dian citizen Lyle Anderson was among the passengers who sus-
tained fatal injuries in the accident.68 Mr. Anderson’s estate filed
suit, and his daughter, sisters, and brother joined seeking dam-
ages.69 Comair moved the court to dismiss all the wrongful
death claims except the claim asserted by Mr. Anderson’s estate
because, under the Montreal Convention, Kentucky law applied
and Kentucky’s wrongful death statute did not allow the other
plaintiffs to recover.70 Mr. Anderson’s family asserted that Cana-
dian law should apply to their claims under the doctrine of depe-
cage, and they asserted that Canadian law allowed children and
siblings to recover.71
The court began its analysis by assuming that the Montreal
Convention was applicable to the claims and by noting that, in
the present case, application of the Convention would have no
impact on the choice of law analysis for the issue presented.72
The court stated that the Montreal Convention preserved the
forum’s law on issues related to the persons who have the right
to file suit, including the forum’s choice of law rules.73 The
court noted that, as it relates to choice of law, Kentucky’s rule
was simple—if the court has jurisdiction, a Kentucky court will
apply its own law: “When the court has jurisdiction of the par-
ties, its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law.
Kentucky . . . Kentucky law will apply if Kentucky has any significant contacts with
the action.” Saleba v. Schrand, 300 S.W.3d 177, 181 n.2 (Ky. 2009).
66 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 2008 WL 2151995.








72 Id. at *2.
73 Id. (stating that under the Montreal Convention “[q]uestions as to who are
the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights
are left to the law of the forum, including conflicts of law”).
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The basic law is the law of the forum, which should not be dis-
placed without valid reasons.”74 The court recognized that the
concept of depecage, which applies different states’ laws to differ-
ent issues, was incompatible with Kentucky’s choice of law rule,
which applies only one state’s law.75 Accordingly, the court
granted Comair’s motion and dismissed the claims at issue.76
As one can see, there are many reasons for the rejection of lex
fori. The doctrine arguably fosters forum shopping, and, just like
lex loci delicti, it can result in the application of law with minimal
connection to the facts of the case. However, it does avoid the
alleged perils of depecage, which some complain results in a
patchwork of law being applied at trial.77 In any event, lex fori is
only applied in an extreme minority of U.S. jurisdictions, and
may be moving towards extinction.
C. THE RESTATEMENT’S MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
The majority of states generally follow the choice of law stan-
dards set out in the Restatement.78 The Restatement contains
guiding principles for a variety of cases, depending on the cause
of action at issue.79 When it comes to wrongful death and per-
sonal injury cases, the courts generally apply the list of princi-
ples contained in §§ 6, 145, and 175, which are collectively
referred to as the “most significant relationship test.”80
The general principle of the most significant relationship test
is that “[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an
issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties . . . .”81 This is determined
through a qualitative evaluation of a list of contacts (enumer-
74 Id. (quoting Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972)).
75 Id. It is interesting to note that the court also recognized prior cases holding
that, when an accident occurs in Kentucky, that fact alone justifies the applica-
tion of Kentucky law. Id. at *3. This appears to be a version of the lex loci delicti
rule, which applies the law of the state where the injury occurred. Id. (citing
Adam v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 130 F.3d 219, 231 (6th Cir. 1997); and then
citing Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Ky. 1968)).
76 Id.
77 Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 802–03 (Ind. 2004).
78 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 111 (2018).
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 175 (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
80 See, e.g., Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1138 (N.D.
Tex. 1980).
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1971) (emphasis added).
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ated in § 145) considered with reference to a separate list of
policy factors (enumerated in § 6).82 In other words, it is not
appropriate “merely to tally the [number of] contacts and
choose the state with the greatest number.”83 Rather, it is the
quality of the contacts that determines which jurisdiction has
the most significant relationship.84
The list of contacts to be considered in applying the test are as
follows:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the par-
ties is centered.85
These contacts are evaluated with reference to the following pol-
icy factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the rel-
ative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.86
Upon reflection of the components of the most significant rela-
tionship test, it is clear that the list of contacts is fairly simple to
amass. It is largely a recitation of basic facts. The real challenge
in this test lies in the evaluation of the quality of each of the
contacts, establishing their relative importance to the litigation,
and in determining the needs and policies of the various inter-
ested jurisdictions, which are often difficult to ascertain with any
degree of certainty. Indeed, this appears to be part of the con-
cern expressed by the courts when characterizing choice of law
82 Id. § 145(2).
83 E.g., Herrera v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 2009 WL 700645, at *7 (S.D. Tex.
2009).
84 Id.
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(a)–(d) (AM. LAW
INST. 1971).
86 Id. § 6(2)(a)–(g)
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as a “veritable jungle.”87 On top of that, there are the inherent
difficulties presented by the application of a law (and sometimes
a language and culture) foreign to the court, which may be too
much to bear. Below, we will discuss the application of certain of
the factors listed in the most significant relationship test and dis-
cuss their impact on the choice of law analysis.
1. The Place Where the Injury Occurred: “The Fortuity Factor”
Under Restatement § 145(a), the court is to evaluate “the
place where the injury occurred.”88 This idea is repeated in Re-
statement § 175, which creates a preference for the application
of the law of “the state where the injury occurred.”89 The com-
ments to § 175 state that the place of injury is “not necessarily
that where the death occurs.”90 Instead, it is defined as the
“place where the force set in motion by the actor first takes ef-
fect on the person.”91 However, for all practical purposes, in air-
craft accident litigation, this is likely to be the location of the
accident.92 We call this the “fortuity factor” because, over the
decades, courts have repeatedly stated that “in aircraft accident
cases the place of the injury is almost always fortuitous and thus
is not entitled to its usual weight in the choice of laws deci-
sion.”93 Like most generalizations, there is always an example of
when this is true; however, there are many where it is not. There
are certainly accidents that occur in locations that have no real
connection to the parties or the events allegedly giving rise to
the accident.94 It is not uncommon for this to occur in airline
accident litigation where the aircraft often overfly multiple
87 See In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on Aug. 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp.
793, 795 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (quoting In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F.
Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975)).
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
89 Id. § 175.
90 Id. § 175 cmt. b.
91 Id.
92 See id. § 145.
93 Foster v. United States, 768 F.2d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 1985).
94 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Beechcraft Corp., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1167 (N.D. Ok.
2017) (“The parties agree that the place where the injury occurred is fortuitous,
because none of the parties is from Indiana and the destination of the flight has
no bearing on plaintiffs’ claims.”).
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states carrying passengers from multiple states.95 However, in
other cases, it is important to give this factor greater attention.
For example, in Wert v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was asked to apply
the most significant relationship test in connection with the
crash of an F-4C Phantom fighter jet in Arizona.96 The aircraft
was operated and maintained by the Indiana Air National
Guard.97 The court was asked to evaluate the laws of Arizona,
Missouri, and Indiana.98 In considering the location of the acci-
dent, the court rejected the general rule assigning little weight
to the place of injury in aircraft accident cases and made a sub-
stantive evaluation of the connections between the flight, the
parties, and the location of the accident:
The Court, however, rejects defendants’ talismanic approach to
this case. This is not a typical flyover case. Major Wert was as-
signed to Luke Air Force Base in Arizona for the purpose of read-
iness training. At the time of the accident, Major Wert was
conducting simulated bombing runs over the Gila Bend Tactics
Range. He took off from, and was planning to land, at Luke Air
Force Base. Therefore, there is more to Major Wert’s presence in
Arizona than the fortuitous flyover or [traversing] of Arizona air
space.99
A similar analysis was performed by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Arteaga.100 Arteaga involved
a helicopter accident that occurred in Mexico involving Mexi-
can citizens traveling from one Mexican state to another.101 The
trial court originally determined that the location of the acci-
dent was fortuitous because the accident occurred in the Mexi-
can state of Veracruz, which otherwise had no connection to the
decedents.102 However, the Delaware Supreme Court disagreed:
“it is irrelevant that the Mexican state in which the helicopter
crashed was ‘fortuitous’—the helicopter’s location in the vic-
95 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, Denver, Colo. on Nov.
15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1452 (D. Colo. 1988) (stating that, in air crash cases,
courts often view the place of the crash (“the situs of injury”) as fortuitous).
96 Wert v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 634 F. Supp. 401, 402-03 (E.D. Mo.
1986).
97 Id. at 404.
98 Id. at 404–06.
99 Id. at 404.
100 113 A.3d 1045, 1048 (Del. 2015).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1053.
2018] APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW 733
tim’s home country of Mexico was not.”103 As the court noted,
“plaintiffs cannot invoke the fortuity concept when they were
injured ‘in their own home countries.’”104
2. The Place Where the Conduct Causing the Injury Occurred: “The
Fault Factor”
“The fault factor” draws a distinction between the place where
the injury occurred (discussed above) and “the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred,” which is referenced in the
Restatement § 145(2)(b).105 In product liability cases, this has
traditionally been associated with the location where the prod-
uct was designed, manufactured, and tested.106 Indeed, this ap-
pears to be the majority rule.107 However, as some have
recognized, focusing on the location of manufacturing activities
could create a “perverse incentive for jurisdictions” to change
their laws to restrict remedies available in products cases so as to
attract manufacturers and create jobs.108 Those courts have be-
gun locating the injury-causing conduct at the place where the
product was marketed, used, or both.109 This currently appears
to be a minority view.
3. The Protection of the Justified Expectations of the Parties: “The
Forsaken Factor”
Although Restatement § 6(2)(d) requires the court to con-
sider the “protection of justified expectations” of the parties,
this factor is largely cast aside in tort cases, which is why we refer
to it as “the forsaken factor.”110 Section 145, comment b, states
that the expectations of the parties are “of extreme importance
in such fields as contracts, property, wills and trust.”111 However,
103 Id. at 1054.
104 Id. at 1053–54.
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
106 E.g., Johnson v. Am. Leather Specialties Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1167
(N.D. Iowa 2008) (“Courts have recognized in products liability cases that the
place where the allegedly defective product was designed, marketed, or manufac-
tured is ‘the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,’ and have
given significant weight to that factor in the conflict-of-laws calculus.”).
107 See id.
108 Bell Helicopter Textron, 113 A.3d at 1055.
109 Id. at 1055.
110 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
111 Id. § 145 cmt. b.
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that comment goes on to minimize such expectations, stating
that they are “of lesser importance” because those who commit
negligent acts without consideration of what law may be applied:
[P]ersons who cause injury on nonprivileged occasions, particu-
larly when the injury is unintentionally caused, usually act with-
out giving thought to the law that may be applied to determine
the legal consequences of this conduct. Such persons have few, if
any, justified expectations in the area of choice of law to protect,
and as to them the protection of justified expectations can play
little or no part in the decision of a choice of law question. Like-
wise, the values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of re-
sult are of lesser importance in torts than in areas where the
parties and their lawyers are likely to give thought to the problem
of the applicable law in planning their transactions.112
Whether or not one agrees with the comment’s assumption re-
garding the expectations of law to be applied to manufacturers,
or even aircraft operators, the courts generally rely on this com-
ment to forsake this factor in accident cases.
4. The Ease of Determination and Application of the Law to Be
Applied: “The Foreigner Factor”
Under Restatement § 6(2)(g), the court must consider the
“ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied.”113 This principle is unlikely to be much of a factor when
comparing the laws of the sister states within the United States.
As discussed above, most U.S. courts will take judicial notice of
the laws of their sister states.114 However, the weight and impor-
tance of this factor appears to increase as the distance between
the various interested jurisdictions increases, not only in terms
of miles, but in terms of language, culture, and legal framework.
There are times when the gap is simply too large, resulting in
the rejection of foreign law. In one case, the law to be applied
was so foreign that it seemed to give the court double vision,
causing us to identify this factor as “the foreigner factor.”
In Boromei v. United States, the court wrestled with a request to
apply the law of Saudi Arabia to a mid-air collision that occurred
in Florida.115 Ameer Bukhari (Bukhari), a Saudi Arabian na-
tional who sustained fatal injuries in the accident, was one of the
112 Id.
113 Id. § 6(2)(g).
114 See, e.g., Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Colvin v. Colvin, 291
S.W.3d 508, 513 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, no pet.).
115 Boromei v. United States, 2003 WL 25796654, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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pilots involved in the collision. Talal Mekki (Mekki), for the Es-
tate of Ameer Bukhari, sued the United States asserting negli-
gence by air traffic control.116 The United States moved to apply
the law of Saudi Arabia to Mekki’s damages claims.117 Mekki as-
serted that Florida law should apply, and that Saudi Arabia had
no interest in the litigation.118
Reciting the contacts between Saudi Arabia, Florida, and the
facts underlying the litigation, the court noted that the accident
occurred in Florida, and the alleged negligence was committed
by air traffic controllers located in Florida.119 However, the
court also noted that Bukhari was a citizen of Saudi Arabia and
was present in Florida for flight training as an employee of
Saudi Arabian Airlines.120 Based on the visa held by Bukhari, he
was required to return to Saudi Arabia upon completion of his
flight training or after approximately twelve months.121 Given
these facts, the court found that both Saudi Arabia and Florida
had an interest in the application of their law to the litigation.122
However, the court found a greater challenge in its evaluation
of the various policy factors recited in Restatement § 6, espe-
cially the “ease in determination and application of the law to be
applied.”123
From the start, it was clear that the court was troubled by the
difficulties associated with the application of laws rooted in a
religion, culture, and language that were completely foreign to
the court. As the court put it, “[w]hat this Court confronts here
is not simply a conflict of laws but perhaps a conflict of cul-
tures.”124 The court noted that both parties agreed that “Saudi
law is derived from Islam and the Koran” and that wrongful
death actions “are governed by a system of diyya,” referred to by
the court as “a system of ‘blood money.’”125 Evaluating the re-
quested limitation on damages, the court found that neither le-
gal system was threatened by the application of the other, and
the court recognized competing arguments regarding the pro-
priety of applying religious law in a secular court:
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at *1–2.




123 Id. at *5.
124 Id. at *3.
125 Id.
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A limitation of damages for Plaintiff would not offend Florida,
and this Court sees no reason that an award greater than the
value of 100 camels would be offensive to Saudi law. As the Court
explained above, there is no Saudi interest in limiting the dam-
ages paid by the United States. There may be an argument that
some religious and cultural interest exists which favors the limit-
ing of damages received by a follower of Islam even in a court of
secular law, however it might be said also that the notion of ap-
plying religious law in a secular court presents a competing
interest.126
However, the court ultimately determined that such competing
arguments need not be resolved because the difficulties in ascer-
taining and applying Saudi law far outweighed any interest
Saudi Arabia may have in the litigation.127 The court found that
it was clearly better prepared to apply Florida law.128 And, the
court noted that the competing experts hired by the parties had
presented competing opinions on Saudi law, which the court
was not equipped to resolve: “Without even a rudimentary un-
derstanding of either Arabic or Islam, this Court is reluctant to
venture into a field so foreign not only in terms of national bor-
ders but also in fundamental principles.”129 Ultimately, the court
determined that financial and time costs associated with the ap-
plication of Saudi law were not warranted by any interest Saudi
Arabia may have in the litigation.130 Thus, the court denied the
motion to apply Saudi law.131
Boromei presents some “food for thought” when it comes to
the practical application of the foreigner factor. It should be ex-
pected that a court will react with hesitation when the parties
present two divergent recitations of foreign law. And this hesita-
tion will be exacerbated when the court speaks a different lan-
guage, the court has limited resources, and the damages are
valued based on the price of livestock.132
126 Id. at *4.





132 Id. at *4–5.
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5. The Basic Policies Underlying the Particular Field of Law: “The
Fudge Factor”
One of the most challenging factors to address is Restatement
§ 6(2)(e), which is the consideration of “the basic policies un-
derlying the particular field of law” at issue.133 This area is often
difficult to address because of the lack of easily available authori-
ties to support the parties’ arguments, especially when the case
involves the laws of a foreign country. This is why we call this
one “the fudge factor.” It presents an opportunity and a risk.
When there is a lack of direct authority on a policy matter, the
courts must often resort to “presumption” in order to address
this factor, divining the evident policies and presuming the
likely motivations of the legislature when enacting a body of
law.134 An example of this occurred in Baird v. Bell Helicopter Tex-
tron, Inc.:
The fact that British Columbia has failed to adopt an equivalent
to § 402A exhibits governmental interests which support the applica-
tion of Texas law to Baird’s claim against Bell. An evident policy of
British Columbia is to protect its citizen manufacturers from ex-
cessive liability resulting from the distribution of domestic prod-
ucts. It is clear that this interest is not involved in the products
liability aspect of this case because the allegedly defective prod-
uct and its manufacturers are both Texan. British Columbia
would presumably be uninterested in the outcome of a products
case involving a Texas defendant. Along with its desire to insulate
its citizens from excessive liability, however, British Columbia is
likely to have the implicit paternalistic interest in seeing that its
injured citizens are compensated and that those parties causing
their injuries are held responsible. That interest would be fur-
thered by the application of Texas law.135
As one can see from the quote above, the fudge factor provides
the opportunity to educate the court about the substantive
polices underlying the relevant body of law at issue. And, it pro-
vides the risk that the court could establish a basis for the appli-
cation of local law based on presumption and “evident” policies.
Legislative history (if available) and comprehensive affidavit tes-
timony of an expert in the foreign law at issue may be the best
defense against the fudge factor. However, there may be times
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(e) (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
134 See, e.g., Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
135 Id. at 1141 (emphasis added).
738 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
when legislative history is unavailable. In those events, the fudge
factor may be used as a justification for a decision when it really
should not be evaluated at all due to the lack of reliable
authorities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Choice of law may be a jungle, but it is certainly not unnaviga-
ble or impenetrable. Choice of law provides a litigant with the
opportunity to shape the trial of a case in a way that best reflects
the interests of the parties and the states involved. The practical
reality associated with choice of law is that virtually everyone pre-
fers the law that they feel comfortable with—the law they
learned and applied through their practice. Choice of law seeks
to push the parties and the court outside of their comfort zones,
and that can be difficult to accomplish. Accordingly, if one plans
to enter the jungle, advanced preparation and development of
the necessary evidence is key to survival. Good luck and beware
of the wildlife.
